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Abstract—This paper uses representative panel data on 1,701 Bulgarian
and 2,047 Romanian manufacturing firms to analyze how price-cost
margins are affected by privatization and competitive pressure. Privatiza-
tion is associated with higher price-cost margins. This effect is stronger in
highly competitive sectors, which suggests that the creation of competitive
markets and privatization go together. It also suggests that privatized firms
reduce costs rather than increase prices, as in highly competitive markets
firms are more likely pricetakers. Import penetration is associated with
lower price-cost margins in sectors where product market concentration is
high, but in more competitive sectors this effect is reversed.
I. Introduction
The transition from a centrally planned to a marketeconomy in central and eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union offers a unique natural experiment to analyze
the effects of privatization and the emergence of competi-
tive pressure on firm behavior. This paper uses representa-
tive firm-level data of two emerging economies, Bulgaria
and Romania, to study how privatization and competitive
pressure have affected price-cost margins. Unlike other
emerging economies of central and eastern Europe, Bulgaria
and Romania are slow reformers. Bulgaria is a small open
economy with a population of 8 million and a GDP per
capita of 1,513 USD in 1999. Romania is one of the largest
central and eastern European countries, with a population of
22.3 million and a GDP per capita that is very close to the
one in Bulgaria: 1,512 USD in 1999.
This paper is motivated by the rapid institutional changes
that characterized most of the transition economies in the
1990s. Under communism, the central planner’s bias in
favor of large-scale production facilities resulted in a dis-
torted firm size distribution relative to the one in market
economies. For instance, whereas at the start of the transi-
tion process in most central and eastern European countries
between 80% and 97% of the workforce was employed in
companies with 500 or more workers, in most of the western
European market economies this fraction varied between
40% and 62% (Roland, 2000). The transition from plan to
market consisted of rapid price liberalization, by the re-
moval of price controls and direct subsidies, and the cre-
ation of a large private sector, by allowing new firm startups
and privatizing the state sector.
It is often argued in theoretical discussions of privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises in central and eastern Europe
that institutional restructuring should precede privatization.1
Tirole (1991), among others, argues that privatization with-
out preparatory “de-monopolization” would create a market
dominated by private firms with considerable market power
(monopoly power), as under central planning many prod-
ucts were produced by only a few production entities and
imports were unlikely to be a significant competitive con-
straint. Li (1999) shows that the rapid decentralization and
privatization of the state monopolized industrial structure
can contribute to the severe output collapse observed in
many transition economies. Joskow and Schmalensee
(1995) and Joskow, Schmalensee, and Tsukanova (1994)
point out that in the case of Russia product-level concen-
tration of production created potential monopoly problems.
Although restructuring prior to privatization would have
been desirable in Russia, political and informational con-
straints largely precluded it.
These papers provide an argument for the traditional
criticisms of privatization. Simply transferring from the
state to the private sector may lead to substantial market
power in firms, which may be exploited at the expense of
the rest of society. This view of privatization, however, is
static and ignores any positive dynamic effects that may
arise from privatization.
In particular, the incomplete contracts approach, as de-
veloped by Grossman and Hart (1986) among others, offers
some relevant insights. For example, Hart, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997) show that changing ownership from state to
private alters the residual control rights, which raises the
incentives for the new owners to invest in new and better
technology.2 Such catching-up investment may be very
relevant for transition economies, given that most of the
equipment state-owned enterprises worked with was obso-
lete due to lack of innovation under the communist rule.
Schmidt (1996) also shows in an incomplete-contracts ap-
proach that privatization gives better cost-saving incentives
to managers due to the harder budget constraints under
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private ownership, but at the expense of allocative effi-
ciency.
In these cases, private ownership will be associated with
higher price-cost margins, which may be driven by cheaper
ways of producing and/or higher product quality, reflected
in higher prices. If these new technologies diffuse easily and
hence spillovers to other firms are substantial, welfare may
improve.
Similar arguments can be made about the effects of
increased competitive pressure on firms’ price-cost margins.
A large empirical literature has studied the effects of trade
liberalization on firms’ price-cost margins. Levinsohn
(1993), Harrison (1994), and Krishna and Mitra (1998) all
report reduced price-cost margins when firms are exposed to
more import competition. Konings and Vandenbussche
(2005) find evidence that firms’ price-cost margins increase
once they enjoy antidumping protection against foreign
importers. These papers suggest that trade liberalization
disciplines firms to price closer to marginal costs. In a
dynamic context, however, the key question is whether trade
protection will induce technologically backward producers
to invest in catching up.3 Rodrik (1992) points out that it
may if the protection induces a larger effective market size
and a larger payoff from marginal cost reductions for
domestic firms. However, he also shows that protection may
enhance collusion between domestic producers, which in-
duces them to stick with old technologies.
A number of papers have studied the effects of privatiza-
tion and competitive pressure on firm performance4 in
transition and developing economies, where performance
was usually measured in an ad hoc way such as by labor
productivity, growth in sales, or number of layoffs. In
contrast, this paper studies whether increased competitive
pressure, brought about by trade and price liberalization and
by privatization of state-owned enterprises, has been asso-
ciated with changing price-cost margins of firms.
It is particularly interesting to take the price-cost margin
(P  c)/P, with P the product price and c the marginal cost
of production, as a measure of performance, as it can be
linked nicely to structural models of firm behavior. The
price-cost margin is also known as the Lerner index of
monopoly power and gives an indication of how competi-
tive an industry is in terms of pricing close to marginal
costs. Under perfect competition, the Lerner index is 0. A
difficulty in using this measure, however, is that marginal
costs are not observable. We therefore estimate price-cost
margins using a method proposed by Roeger (1995), who
starts from Hall (1988), showing that the presence of im-
perfect competition requires a markup adjustment in the
primal Solow residual. The Hall (1988) type of approach
suffers from a potential simultaneity bias between output
growth and the growth in the input factors; Roeger over-
comes this problem by subtracting the dual Solow residual
from the primal. This implies that price-cost margins can be
estimated consistently, without having to appeal to instru-
mental variables, which are usually hard to find in micro
data. This approach can therefore be placed among the
recent papers that aim to estimate total factor productivity
consistently, such as Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003).
An additional advantage of this method is that it allows us
to use the nominal value of data on sales and input factors,
without having to deflate them with a price deflator. This is
important because in an emerging economy it is not always
clear what the appropriate price deflator is, given that prices
were only recently liberalized and that prices themselves are
outcomes of firm behavior.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We find
that privatization is associated with higher price-cost mar-
gins than in state-owned enterprises, and this effect seems
stronger for foreign-owned private firms. We also find that
international competition, measured by import penetration,
reduces price-cost margins, especially in highly concen-
trated sectors, but this effect reverses in lowly concentrated
sectors. Finally, the effects of privatization are stronger in
highly competitive sectors, which suggest that privatization
results in cost cutting by the new owners, which is consis-
tent with the recent incomplete contract theories on privat-
ization. However, a full analysis of the dynamic effects of
privatization is beyond the scope of this paper. Although in
the long run privatization may lead to more innovation and
better product quality, which may be reflected in higher
price-cost margins, we focus mainly on the short-run effects
of privatization. The main reason for our limited scope is the
short time span of privatized firms in our data and the lack
of information on firm-level innovation. We consider this to
be a promising area for future research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section describes the econometric approach. Section III
discusses the data that we use, and section IV gives the
results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. Background and Econometric Model
Our methodology is based on Roeger (1995), which starts
from the approach that Hall (1988) introduced to estimate
total factor productivity, showing that the presence of im-
perfect competition requires an adjustment in the computa-
tion of total factor productivity. Roeger’s work was moti-
vated by the apparent low correlation between the primal
and dual Solow residuals. He shows that this lack of
correlation can mostly be explained by the presence of
imperfect competition. In doing so, however, Roeger also
3 Tybout (2001) provides a comprehensive overview of the static and
dynamic arguments for trade protection.
4 Examples include La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (1999) for Mexico;
Lizal, Singer and Svejnar (2001) and Kocenda and Svejnar (2002) for the
Czech Republic; Brown and Earle (2001) for Russia; and Frydman et al.
(1999), Claessens and Djankov (2002), Hersch, Kemme, and Bhandari
(1994), Halpern and Ko¨ro¨si (1997), Dobrinsky (1996), and Walsh and
Whelan (2001) for various central and eastern European economies.
Surveys include Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin (2002).
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introduced a very elegant, consistent way to estimate price-
cost margins, without having to worry about potential cor-
relations between the unobserved productivity shocks and
the input factors of production. This section introduces this
methodology.5
We start from a standard production function Q  it 
F(Nit, Kit, Mit), where i is an index for the firm, t is a time
index, Q is output, F is a production function, it is the
productivity term (or firm-level efficiency), N is labor input,
K is capital input, and M is material input. If privatization is
associated with access to better technology, improved prod-
uct quality, and more incentives to engage in innovation,
then the productivity term it should be higher after privat-
ization. However, as we will demonstrate below, there is no
need to assume this explicitly in our modeling strategy, as
this productivity term will cancel out in our final equation.
Assuming constant returns to scale and perfect competi-
tion, the growth rate of output (the Solow output decompo-
sition) is
Qit
Qit  Nit
Nit
Nit
 Kit
Kit
Kit
 Mit
Mit
Mit
 it, (1)
where Jit  PJitJit/PitQit ( J  N, K, M) is the cost share
of inputs in turnover, PJ stands for the unit cost of input
factor J, and it  it/it. Under imperfect competition
equation (1) becomes (Hall, 1988)
Qit
Qit  itNit NitNit  Kit KitKit  Mit MitMit   it,
(2)
where   P/c is the markup of price over marginal cost.
Another way to write it is
Qit
Qit  Nit
Nit
Nit
 Mit
Mit
Mit
 	1  Nit  Mit

Kit
Kit
 itQitQit  KitKit   	1  it
it, (3)
where it  (Pit  cit)/Pit  1  1/it is the price-cost
margin, or Lerner index, of firm i at time t, in which cit
stands for the marginal cost of firm i at time t.
The problem in estimating equations (2) or (3) as in
Levinsohn (1993) and Harrison (1994) is that unobserved
productivity shocks, captured by it, may be correlated with
the input factors K, M, and N. One way to deal with this
problem is to use instrumental variables. However, often it
will be difficult to find good instruments. Fixed effects can
be used if the nature of the endogeneity is assumed to be
constant over time. Some recent solutions have been pro-
posed to deal with this problem in estimating production
functions. Olley and Pakes (1996) show how to use invest-
ment to control for the potential correlation between input
levels and the unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks.
However, this method requires information on positive
investment, which is often lacking and which would reduce
the sample size considerably.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of the error term in
equation (3) we follow Roeger (1995) in using a similar
expression to equation (3), but derived from the price-based,
or dual, Solow residual:
Nit
PNit
PNit
 Mit
PMit
PMit
 	1 Nit  Mit

PKit
PKit

Pit
Pit
itPitPit  PKitPKit  	1 it
it. (4)
Then, subtracting equation (4) from (3), we get
QitQit  PitPit   NitNitNit  PNitPNit   Mit
 MitMit  PMitPMit  	1 Nit  Mit
KitKit  PKitPKit  (5)
 itQitQit  PitPit   KitKit  PKitPKit  .
Note that the error term capturing unobserved productivity
shocks has canceled out, and therefore , the Lerner index,
can be estimated consistently. Note also that any shifts in
technology that affect the production function due to pri-
vatization are controlled for, as the productivity terms have
canceled out.
Equation (5) shows that in order to obtain an estimate of
the price-cost margin, we need information on sales growth,
growth in the wage bill, growth in material costs, and
growth in the value of capital. The company accounts
information we have on Bulgarian and Romanian firms
allowed us to get firm-level data on these variables. The
income statements provided us the information on sales, the
wage bill, and material costs in consecutive years. For
capital we used the book value of the fixed tangible assets
taken from the balance sheet; for the rental price of capital
(PKit) we followed Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Hsieh
(2002), taking PKit  PI(rit  it), where PI stands for the
index of investment goods prices, measured at the country
level, rit stands for the real interest rate for each period, and
 stands for the depreciation rate, measured at the firm level
(see the Data Appendix for details).
Rewriting the left-hand side of equation (5) as y, which
is the difference between the primal and the dual Solow
residual, and the right-hand side as x, and adding a white
5 A maintained assumption in this approach is that of profit maximiza-
tion and cost minimization. Evidence for transition economies shows that
early on in the transition, firms did move to profit maximization strategies
(e.g., Lizal & Svejnar, 2002). Also, Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess
(1994) show that state-owned enterprises started to engage in profit-
maximizing strategies prior to privatization.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS126
noise error term εit, we obtain a very simple testable
equation:
yit  itxit  εit. (5)
For empirical tractability we further need to make the
assumption, as is done in all applications of this type [see
Levinsohn (1993) for further arguments], that the markups
are the same for all firms within the same sector or group of
firms that we will consider. It is not possible to estimate a
markup for each firm separately, because we would not have
enough degrees of freedom. To assess the effect of trade,
product market concentration, and ownership on firms’
price-cost margins it  (Pit  cit)/Pit, we interact x
with sector-level data on concentration and import penetra-
tion, and firm-level data on ownership. Then equation (5)
can be written as
yit  1xit  2xit  IMPjt  3xit  HERFjt
 4xit  PRIVit  5xit  FORit  6xit
 HERFjt  IMPjt  1HERFjt  2IMPjt
 3PRIVit  4FORit  i  εit, (6)
where HERFjt stands for the Herfindahl index of concen-
tration in sector j at time t, measured at the three-digit
NACE level of industrial classification. It can be seen as a
measure of domestic competition, as it does not include
import penetration. IMPjt stands for the import penetration
in sector j at time t, measured at the three-digit NACE level;
PRIVit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i is more than 50%
owned by private domestic shareholders in year t, and
FORit is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is more than 50%
owned by foreign shareholders in year t.6 We include the
ownership variables and competition variables also sepa-
rately in equation (6) to capture any difference between the
primal and the dual Solow residual that is not explained by
market power. Finally, i stands for an unobservable firm-
level fixed effect, which may capture unobserved sunk
costs, quality of the managers, and other fixed factors we
may not observe. Such fixed effects control also for the
potential selection effects into privatization, provided that
the probability of privatization remains constant over the
sample period.
At this stage, however, we need to make a number of
critical remarks concerning this method. First, the error term
in equation (6) should in principle be zero, given that the
productivity shocks in equation (5) canceled out. Roeger
(1995) points out a number of reasons for having a nonzero
error term in (6), but they would not cause a problem for
consistent estimation.
In particular, measurement error of the labor input is one
potential source of a nonzero error term. We measure labor
input as the number of workers in a particular firm, without
taking into account the number of hours they work. Because
hours worked appear only on the left-hand side of equation
(5), this measurement error does not constitute a problem
for the estimations. There may, however, also be measure-
ment error in the capital stock, which appears both on the
left and the right side in equation (5). We believe that the
potential measurement error in the capital stock is rather
limited. In transition economies it is often claimed that firms
were operating with an obsolete capital stock, which may
cause some error when just the tangible fixed assets of a
firm are considered as the measure for capital. However, in
constructing our value of the capital stock we have used the
actual depreciation rate at the firm level. We used the total
amount of depreciations to construct the depreciation rate,
which takes into account increased depreciations as a con-
sequence of the transition. In addition we also experimented
with applying the Roeger method assuming that capital is
fixed. This implies that the terms related to capital drop out
in equation (5). Our main results remained robust.
Another concern with the current specification is that in
transition countries, especially in the state-owned enter-
prises, labor hoarding may be present, which may also result
in a nonzero error term in equation (6). Shapiro (1987)
argues that the primal and the dual Solow residual are
affected differently by the state of demand. Labor hoarding
occurs when demand is low, but workers are not sacked.
This may happen during recessions or in state-owned en-
terprises. Roeger (1995) extends his model and shows that
an extra term in equation (5) capturing such demand effects
must be added to control for labor hoarding. We add
controls for cyclical demand effects, by using year dum-
mies, but in addition we also add controls for different
demand effects in private versus state-owned enterprises, by
including the ownership dummies separately in our regres-
sion, as can be seen in equation (6).
A further criticism is the maintained assumption of con-
stant returns to scale in this method. Not allowing for
varying returns to scale may result in an upward or down-
ward bias in the markup levels, according to returns to scale
are decreasing or increasing, as shown by Basu and Fernald
(1997). Basu and Fernald, using U.S. manufacturing data,
find firm-level returns to scale to be constant or slightly
decreasing. In view of that result, we would expect Roeger’s
(1995) estimates on firm-level data to show (if any bias at
all) an upward bias stemming from decreasing returns at the
firm level. At first sight it seems this bias in the level
estimates need not necessarily affect the change in markups,
which is what we want to focus on in this paper. However,
taking into account that state-owned firms in transition
economies were operating at very large scales, presumably
at decreasing returns, we infer that privatization has resulted
in downsizing, which may have increased the returns to
6 We also experimented with using the full fraction of shares held by
each ownership category, rather than a dummy indicating majority own-
ership. The results remained robust.
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scale somewhat, in which case Roeger’s (1995) estimates
are bound to be underestimates of the true changes in
markups.
Finally, the fact that we use company accounts data also
implies that we are not able to trace the financial flows
associated with individual products, and, as we have data on
medium and large firms, they are likely to be multiproduct
firms. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that if a firm
has product market power over one of its product, it is likely
to have market power over its other products as well.
Alternatively, we can view our estimates of price-cost mar-
gins as an average firm effect, which is the focus of our
paper: We want to assess whether the big institutional
changes, like privatization and the opening up of markets to
international trade, have had an impact on the average
price-cost margins of firms in transition economies.
III. Data
Our data are derived from a commercial database named
Amadeus, collected by the consultancy Bureau van Dijk.
The database consists of company accounts reported to
national statistical offices for European companies for
which at least one of the following criteria is satisfied: total
turnover or assets of at least $12 million, or total employ-
ment of at least 150. Financial and operational information
is available for 1994 through 1998, and we retrieve all
manufacturing companies in Bulgaria and Romania for
which unconsolidated accounts were available: 1,701 Bul-
garian and 2,047 Romanian firms.7 The Data Appendix
provides more details on the peculiarities of these data.
Earlier studies mostly had to rely on small samples of
firms—usually of a few hundred—collected through sur-
veys (Hersch et al., 1994; Frydman et al., 1999; Walsh &
Whelan, 2001). The sample in this paper contains virtually
the entire population of medium and large enterprises in
manufacturing in Bulgaria and Romania.
The ownership information per firm in the data set refers
only to the years 1997 and 1998. It would have been
interesting to analyze the effects of ownership on market
power from 1994 onward, but most of the privatizations in
Bulgaria and Romania started only after 1997. Claessens
and Djankov (2002) pointed out that only around 7% of the
state owned enterprises in manufacturing were privatized in
the first half of the 1990s; the mass privatizations were only
from 1997 onward. To check the robustness of our results
we will also report estimates for the entire sample period
1994–1998, making the assumption that all firms before
1997 in our sample were still state-owned.
Table 1 shows the fraction of firms in our sample that can
be classified as majority owned private, majority-owned
foreign, and majority-owned state firms. Note that the pre-
vious of majority-owned state firms in Romania (42%) is
greater than in Bulgaria (21%). Based on our sample, for
Bulgaria 73% of total value added in manufacturing is
produced by the private sector in 1998 (59% in 1997),
which accounts for 72% of total employment in manufac-
turing in 1998 (59% in 1997). This compares with official
numbers reported by the EBRD of a private-sector share in
GDP of 65% and a private-sector share in employment of
61% in 1998. In Romania the private-sector share of value
added in our sample corresponds to 52% in 1998 (45% in
1997), and the employment share to 42% in 1998 (42% in
1997). This compares with official numbers in 1998 of 60%
and 62%, respectively.
In table 2 we show the summary statistics of the variables
retrieved from the company accounts. The Data Appendix
describes the definitions and measurement issues of the
various variables that we employ. We note that the average
firm size in terms of employment is about the same in
Bulgaria and Romania. Furthermore, foreign and state firms
are larger in terms of employment on average than private
domestic ones. We can also note that the sales revenue for
foreign firms, both in Bulgaria and Romania, is the largest.
IV. Results
Table 3 shows the estimates of price-cost margins for
each individual sector in Bulgaria and Romania. We can
note that average price-cost margins vary between sectors,
but also between countries. For most sectors in Bulgaria we
find higher price-cost margins than in Romania. Further-
more, the estimated differences in price-cost margins be-
tween sectors are different in the two countries. For in-
stance, the average price-cost margin in textiles is estimated
at almost 20% in Bulgaria, but only 10% in Romania. The
rank correlation of sectors’ price-cost margins between
Bulgaria and Romania is only 0.004. This suggests that
institutional features, rather than technological, are likely an
important factor explaining why price-cost margins vary
between sectors. Though we do not explicitly consider
institutional changes such as the implementation of compe-
tition policy, laws that enhance new firm entry, trade policy,
and mass privatization programs, the outcomes of such
reforms are likely going to be reflected in increased com-
petitive pressure and privatization.
In our further analysis we pool the data across sectors and
test how the average price-cost margin varies with sector
characteristics related to competitive pressure on the one
hand and with firm characteristics related to ownership on
7 This number is reduced in the analysis as we make use of information
on the capital stock in firms, which is often missing.
TABLE 1.—TYPES OF OWNERSHIP
Type of Firm
Percentage of Firms
in Sample
Bulgaria Romania
Majority domestic private 74 47
Majority foreign 6 11
Majority state 20 42
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the other hand, as shown in equation (6). We start with a
discussion of the effects of competitive pressure, then we
discuss the effects of ownership, and finally we try to assess
whether the main effect of privatization is on cost cutting or
on price increases.
A. The Effect of Competitive Pressure on
Price-Cost Margins
To test whether increased competitive pressure in transi-
tion countries has affected the price-cost margins of firms,
we use two measures to proxy for competitive pressure. The
first relates to domestic competition and is the three-digit
Herfindahl index of concentration. For homogeneous oli-
gopoly models it can be shown that there exists a negative
relationship between the number of firms in an industry and
the price-cost margin (e.g., Sutton, 1991). There exists also
empirical evidence that concentration is positively related to
price-cost margins (e.g., Domowitz, Hubbard, & Petersen,
1988). Our second measure of competitive pressure relates
to international competition, which we measure by import
penetration at the three-digit NACE level.8 We expect im-
port penetration to have a negative effect on price-cost
margins, yielding more competitive pricing behavior of
firms (e.g., Tybout, 2001).
The first two columns of table 4 show the results of our
baseline model specified in equation (6). We can note that
both in Bulgaria and in Romania the average price-cost
margin is estimated higher in highly concentrated sectors.
Highly concentrated sectors reflect less competitive pres-
sure, which allows firms to exert some of their monopoly
power, which is reflected in higher price-cost margins. In
1998 the average Herfindahl index is 18% in Bulgaria,
which suggests that the average price-cost margin in sectors
with a concentration level of 18% or more is at least equal
8 Though import penetration may be an outcome variable and hence
changes in import tariffs may be a more desirable measure of international
competitive pressure, such data were not available at the level of disag-
gregation that we used in our analysis.
TABLE 2.—SUMMARY STATISTICS
Full Sample Majority Private Domestic Majority Foreign Majority State
Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania Bulgaria Romania
Employment 493 469 392 378 730 690 595 624
(981) (1,028) (641) (699) (648) (558) (1,377) (1,525)
Sales 6,634 7,853 4,934 5,173 12,312 10,786 9,085 9,231
(42,850) (52,524) (18,918) (21,441) (19,172) (11,962) (39,604) (43,535)
Wage bill 876 1,012 784 829 1,726 1,856 1,414 1,541
(3,250) (3,901) (2,615) (2,962) (2,066) (2,135) (4,609) (5,109)
Material costs 4,162 5,170 2,817 3,030 7,592 7,066 5,851 6,117
(31,967) (39,348) (13,705) (15,625) (13,032) (8,995) (27,560) (30,418)
Tangible fixed assets 2,664 2,975 2,333 2,464 4,784 5,211 4,672 4,717
(12,017) (14,032) (11,588) (13,060) (5,991) (6,316) (14,349) (15,603)
Depreciation rate 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.06
(0.22) (0.17) (0.22) (0.28) (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; values expressed in thousands of dollars.
TABLE 3.—ESTIMATES OF PRICE-COST MARGINS IN DIFFERENT SECTORS
NACE Code Description Bulgaria Romania
15 Food and beverages 0.19 (0.017)** 0.11 (0.006)**
16 Tobacco 0.21 (0.030)** —
17 Textiles 0.19 (0.016)** 0.10 (0.007)**
18 Wearing apparel; fur 0.20 (0.022)** 0.20 (0.015)**
19 Leather, luggage, and footwear 0.19 (0.039)** 0.16 (0.013)**
20 Wood, straw, and plaiting materials 0.06 (0.036)* 0.006 (0.004)
21 Pulp, paper, and paper products 0.14 (0.017)** 0.15 (0.033)**
22 Publishing, printing, and media 0.42 (0.330) 0.33 (0.046)**
23 Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel — 0.15 (0.013)**
24 Chemicals and chemical products 0.19 (0.021)** 0.13 (0.015)**
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.24 (0.038)** 0.14 (0.012)**
26 Other nonmetallic mineral products 0.15 (0.016)** 0.16 (0.006)**
27 Basic metals 0.21 (0.028)** 0.12 (0.009)**
28 Fabricated metal products 0.17 (0.023)** 0.17 (0.009)**
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.18 (0.020)** 0.17 (0.006)**
30 Office machinery and computers 0.19 (0.019)** 0.31 (0.025)**
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.15 (0.018)** 0.17 (0.008)**
32 Radio, TV, and communication equipment 0.40 (0.20) 0.13 (0.018)**
33 Medical, precision, and optical instruments 0.16 (0.026)** 0.10 (0.025)**
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers 0.005 (0.041) 0.17 (0.010)**
35 Other transport equipment 0.27 (0.17) 0.11 (0.018)**
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 0.21 (0.036)** 0.13 (0.013)**
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ** (*) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (10%) level.
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to 16% (12.4%  0.226  0.18). In less than 3 years the
Herfindahl index in Bulgarian manufacturing has dropped
by a factor of almost 2 (in 1995 it was 30% on average).
This suggests that the reduction in product market concen-
tration has contributed to pricing more competitively. The
coefficient 0.226 suggests that a reduction in product market
concentration of 10 percentage points is equivalent to a
reduction in the average price-cost margin of 2.2 percentage
points. In Romania also, we find that product market con-
centration and price-cost margins are positively correlated.
In 1998 the average Herfindahl index is 14% in Romania,
which means that the average price-cost margin in sectors
with a concentration level of 14% or higher is at least equal
to 6.5% (1.5%  0.36  0.14).
From these estimates we may infer that due to new-firm
entry or enterprise breakups, resulting in lower product
market concentration levels, price-cost margins in firms in
Bulgaria and Romania have declined during the transition
process, suggesting that competitive pressure seems to dis-
cipline firms’ pricing behavior.
The effect of international competitive pressure, mea-
sured by the interaction term with import penetration in
equation (6), is less straightforward. For Bulgaria, in table 4,
we find a positive, but insignificant, direct effect of import
penetration, whereas in Romania the direct effect of import
penetration is even positive and statistically significant, with
a point estimate of 0.035. Both in Bulgaria and Romania
import penetration went up over the sample period. By 1998
the average import penetration in Bulgaria was 42% (com-
pared to 35% in 1995), whereas in Romania by 1998
average import penetration was 36% (compared to 30% in
1995). This positive effect of import penetration is surpris-
ing. However, when we look at the interaction between the
Herfindahl index and import penetration, we find that import
penetration has a negative effect on price-cost margins in
highly concentrated sectors both in Bulgaria and in Roma-
nia. To check whether this effect is driven by an endogeneity
problem related to imports, we also ran the specification
with import penetration lagging by 2 years, but our results
remained the same, and so we omit them here for brevity.
In interpreting these results we need to distinguish be-
tween two potential effects that may affect price-cost mar-
gins. There may be an effect on prices and an effect on
marginal costs. On the one hand, from the international
trade literature mentioned earlier we would expect that
international competitive pressure has some depressing ef-
fect on prices. Especially for firms operating in markets
where they occupy a dominant position, keeping such a
dominant position by cutting prices in response to interna-
tional entry seems a natural effect. This is the likely effect
that we pick up from the negative coefficient on the inter-
action term between import penetration and product market
concentration. It is especially in the highly concentrated
sectors that increased import penetration has a negative
effect on prices. Thus in sectors where domestic competi-
tion was traditionally weak, as reflected in high concentra-
tion levels, opening up to trade helps to enhance pricing
closer to marginal costs.
The positive direct effect of import penetration in Roma-
nia in highly competitive sectors, where firms are more
likely pricetakers, suggests that the main effect is on cutting
marginal costs. The increased competitive pressure that
emerges from the international market may push firms to
engage in more restructuring and innovative activities,
which makes them more cost-efficient.
TABLE 4.—RESULTS
Baseline Model
Robustness Checks
Capital FixedSample 1994–1998
Bulgaria
(1)
Romania
(2)
Bulgaria
(3)
Romania
(4)
Bulgaria
(5)
Romania
(6)
Price-cost margin 0.124** 0.015** 0.17** 0.069** 0.16** 0.21**
(0.029) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) (0.03) (0.016)
Effect of import penetration 0.059 0.035** 0.05 0.018** 0.15** 0.014*
(0.042) (0.006) (0.03) (0.003) (0.058) (0.009)
Effect of Herfindahl index 0.226** 0.356** 0.18** 0.29** 0.04 0.11
(0.087) (0.046) (0.08) (0.04) (0.12) (0.10)
Effect of private domestic firms 0.037* 0.118** 0.03** 0.085** 0.04** 0.055**
(0.018) (0.008) (0.01) (0.006) (0.02) (0.014)
Effect of foreign firms 0.071** 0.133** 0.05* 0.165** 0.09** 0.148**
(0.032) (0.023) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Effect of import penetration  Herfindahl 0.560** 0.18** 0.14 0.07** 0.05 0.013
(0.195) (0.034) (0.16) (0.04) (0.30) (0.06)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test (private  foreign) 0.26 0.54 0.46 0.001 0.25 0.0004
R2 within 0.78 0.61 0.73 0.59 0.32 0.58
R2 between 0.36 0.39 0.24 0.38 0.10 0.27
R2 overall 0.59 0.52 0.46 0.52 0.20 0.42
No. of observations 1,084 1,748 1,454 2,939 1,877 2,877
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ** (*) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (10%) level. The variables import penetration, Herfindahl index, and private and foreign ownership are also included separately
as additional control factors. The estimates refer to equation (6).
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B. The Effect of Private Ownership on Price-Cost Margins
In table 4 we find for both Bulgaria and Romania that
domestically owned private firms have higher price-cost
margins. For Bulgaria, the point estimate of 0.037 suggests
that privatization to domestic owners is associated with an
increase in the average price-cost margin to 16% (0.124 
0.037). For Romania, this effect is bigger. The increase in
price-cost margins when firms are privatized to domestic
owners is estimated at 12 percentage points. Thus private
domestic Romanian firms have an average price-cost mar-
gin of 13.5% (1.5%  11.8%). Also, privatization of state
owned enterprises to foreign owned firms increases price-
cost margins. A point estimate of 0.071 in Bulgaria and of
0.133 in Romania suggests that the average price-cost mar-
gin in foreign firms is almost 20% and 15% for Bulgaria and
Romania respectively. Although the difference is not statis-
tically significant, it is interesting to note that our point
estimates of foreign private ownership are larger than those
of private domestic ownership, which suggests that foreign
firms either are more cost-efficient or set higher prices than
domestic ones.
In table 4 we also report some further robustness checks
of our results. First, as mentioned earlier, the ownership data
only refer to the years 1997 and 1998. We have no infor-
mation on the nature of ownership prior to 1997. However,
from the institutional changes that took place in Bulgaria
and Romania we know that there was little privatization
prior to 1997. As a first robustness check we assume that all
firms prior to 1997 were state-owned. Although this is
clearly a wrong assumption (some firms were privatized
prior to 1997), the results should not be too different, given
that most of the privatizations took place from 1997 on. Any
effect that we pick up should be a lower bound on the true
effect of privatization on price-cost margins. The results for
the full sample running between 1994 and 1998 are reported
in columns (3) and (4) in table 4. Our earlier results are
confirmed. Private ownership is associated with higher
price-cost margins, and the largest effect is with foreign
ownership. We also experimented with just using a balanced
panel, not reported here for brevity; again our main results
remain robust.
A second robustness check is related to the assumption
about the capital stock in firms. The maintained assumption
is that capital is fully flexible. This may be realistic in macro
data, but it is less obvious at the firm level. Furthermore,
measurement error in the capital stock may potentially bias
our results as discussed in section II. As a robustness check
we therefore assumed that capital is fixed, which implies
that the terms related to capital drop out in equation (5). We
would expect that not taking into account the costs that are
associated with the use of capital would result in an over-
estimation of the price-cost margins, but such a bias is less
likely for the change in price-cost margins due to privatiza-
tion. In the last two columns of table 4 we report the results
of this extra robustness check. We can note that the average
price-cost margin is indeed estimated higher, as we would
expect. However, we also note that the effect of private and
foreign ownership on price-cost margins remains positive
and the point estimates are very similar to the ones reported
in our baseline model. The effects of competitive pressure
have become more marginal, but this is not surprising if
competitive pressure and the intensity of capital usage are
correlated.
C. Cost-Cutting or Price-Raising Effects of Privatization?
The estimates of increased price-cost margins do not
allow us to disentangle whether the main effect of privat-
ization is on cost-cutting behavior or on increasing prices. In
an attempt to disentangle these two effects, we split our
sample into two roughly equal subsamples, a highly com-
petitive sector versus a lowly competitive sector, based on
the value of the Herfindahl index of concentration that puts
half of the sample observations in one group and the other
half in the other group. The highly competitive subsample is
characterized by sectors for which the Herfindahl index is
lower than 5%. We also experimented with other cutoffs of
the Herfindahl index, but our results remained qualitatively
the same. We report the results in table 5.
Our earlier result that price-cost margins are lower on
average in highly competitive sectors (low concentration
levels) is confirmed. In the highly competitive sectors in
Bulgaria and Romania pricing is closer to marginal costs
than in the lowly competitive sectors (high concentration
levels). More interestingly, the effect of privatization is
much stronger in the highly competitive sectors. In partic-
ular, privatization in the highly competitive sectors in Bul-
garia raises price-cost margins by almost 10 percentage
points, whereas in the lowly competitive sectors there is no
statistically significant effect of privatization. In Romania,
likewise, the effect of domestic privatization is more than
TABLE 5.—RESULTS FOR HIGHLY VERSUS LOWLY COMPETITIVE SECTORS
Bulgaria Romania
Highly
Competitive
Lowly
Competitive
Highly
Competitive
Lowly
Competitive
Price-cost margin 0.08** 0.18** 0.02** 0.12**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.003) (0.006)
Effect of private
domestic firms 0.095** 0.0001 0.14** 0.062**
(0.026) (0.022) (0.009) (0.01)
Effect of foreign
firms 0.058 0.041 0.157** 0.097**
(0.12) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test (private 
foreign) 0.76 0.18 0.61 0.31
R2 within 0.75 0.79 0.56 0.72
R2 between 0.43 0.44 0.51 0.31
R2 overall 0.60 0.63 0.53 0.55
No. of
observations 541 660 955 874
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** (*) denotes statistically significant at the 5% (10%)
level. The variables private and foreign ownership are also included separately as additional control
factors.
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twice as strong in the highly competitive sectors as in the
lowly competitive sectors. A similar pattern emerges when
we consider foreign ownership in the Romanian sample. For
Bulgaria, the effects of foreign ownership are not that
clear-cut. We find a positive, but not significant, effect of
foreign ownership in both subsamples, and they are not very
different from each other.
These results offer a useful guide for interpretation. In
particular, given that in highly competitive sectors prices are
close to marginal costs and that price-setting behavior is
more difficult, the increase in price-cost margins is likely to
reflect a reduction in marginal costs. This gives support to
the idea that privatization brings about more incentives to
engage in restructuring aimed at reducing costs, as sug-
gested by the incomplete contracts literature discussed in
the introduction. The absence of any increase in price-cost
margins in the lowly competitive sectors in Bulgaria sug-
gests that privatization is not related to increasing prices.
For a small open economy this is also less likely, given that
international competition is an extra force guaranteeing
contestability of markets. In Romania, we find also evidence
of increased price-cost margins in the lowly competitive
sectors, although the increase is much lower. This too could
reflect cost-cutting, but at the same time it could also reflect
increased prices, which could be a consequence of exploit-
ing a dominant market position. Given the weak implemen-
tation of competition policy in Romania, this is not an
unrealistic interpretation. However, increased prices could
also result from an increase in the quality of the product. In
the short time span that we analyze, though, this is less
likely, as it takes time before firms can innovate and change
their product mix.
The findings in table 5 are in line with theoretical pre-
dictions using an incomplete contracts approach to analyze
the costs and benefits of privatization, such as those of
Schmidt (1996). He shows that the comparative advantage
of privatization goes up if there is more competition, as
more product market competition reduces the incentives for
governments to subsidize privatized high-cost firms. This
implies that the budget constraint of the manager under
privatization becomes harder, which increases the incen-
tives of managers to cut costs. Our results also give support
for theoretical models emphasizing the complementarity
and sequencing of reforms (e.g., Dewatripont & Roland,
1992, 1995). The effects of privatization and increased
competitive pressure are similar with respect to incentives
to engage in restructuring which makes the firm more
cost-effective. Both increase the risk of bankruptcy, which
may discipline managerial behavior. However, if firms are
privatized in an environment where product market compe-
tition is weak, also the incentive-enhancing aspects of
changing corporate governance may be diluted. Thus our
results suggest that increasing competitive pressure in mar-
kets first would enhance the effects that may be generated
through privatization. This is of relevance for countries,
such as China and Vietnam, where mass privatization pro-
grams still have to start.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we have used representative firm-level panel
data to analyze how price-cost margins vary with domestic
and international competitive pressure and with private,
foreign, and state ownership in Bulgarian and Romanian
manufacturing industries.
We find that price-cost margins in highly competitive
markets are lower than in lowly competitive markets, a
regularity that is also found for well-developed market
economies. Furthermore, we find some evidence that import
competition depresses firms’ price-cost margins, but only in
sectors where product market competition is weak. This
suggests that opening to trade guarantees contestability of
markets and hence disciplines firms pricing behavior.
We further find that privatized firms, both domestically
and foreign owned have higher price-cost margins than state
firms. This effect holds mainly in highly competitive sec-
tors, which suggests that it is mainly cost cutting that
privatized firms engage in, resulting in higher price-cost
margins. It also suggests that privatizing state-owned enter-
prises without creating a competitive market environment
may have little effect, which gives support for the sequenc-
ing of reforms that may be relevant for other emerging
economies that still have to privatize most of their state-
owned enterprises, such as China and Vietnam.
Our results are based on a short-run analysis of privat-
ization. A long-run analysis would require longer time
series, which would allow an analysis of privatization in a
dynamic context. In particular, whether privatization con-
tributes to increased innovative activities, resulting in better-
quality products, remains an important area for future re-
search.
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DATA APPENDIX
We make use of a commercial database of company accounts, compa-
rable to other company account data sets such as the Compustat database
in the United States or the Exstat database in the United Kingdom. The
database is commercialized under the name “Amadeus” by Bureau van
Dijk (BvD) (www.bvdep.com). The Amadeus data include the information
of the balance sheets and income statements of medium and large
companies in the Eastern Union and in a number of central and eastern
European countries. We retrieved detailed information on 2,047 Romanian
firms and 1,701 Bulgarian firms that operated in the manufacturing sector
between 1994 and 1998. The quality of the data of Romanian and
Bulgarian firms is among the best in the Amadeus data set. We checked
this by taking random samples of firms to verify the consistency and
accuracy of reporting. We verified it by checking annual reports of firms,
and we conducted a number of postal surveys in which we inquired about
the values of a number of variables and compared them with what was
reported in the Amadeus files. Incentives to misreport information by
companies are minimal, as that is regarded as fraud and may lead to
substantial fines. We also compared our data with data from the official
yearbooks to check how representative they were. In particular, the
Amadeus data cover 66% (82%) and 70% (69%) of total manufacturing
employment (sales) in Bulgaria and Romania, respectively.
1. Data on Output and Input Factors
● PQ  operating revenue in thousands of local currency.
● PM M  costs of material inputs in thousands of local currency.
● PN N  cost of employees in thousands of local currency, including
employer and employee social contributions.
● K  net tangible fixed assets, including machinery, equipment, and
buildings, evaluated at book value in thousands of local currency.
● The price of capital is defined as PK  P(r  it), where PI is the
index of investment goods prices; r is a firm-specific real interest
rate, computed as the interest paid relative to total debt minus the
inflation rate based on the consumer price index; and  is a
firm-specific depreciation rate, computed as the total amount of
depreciations in year t divided by net tangible fixed assets in year
t  1. The investment goods price index is taken from the E.U.
AMECO database provided to us by Werner Roeger.
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2. Data on Ownership
The information on ownership is collected directly from the compa-
nies. BvD merges the ownership data it receives from all its information
providers (including those of all other European countries) into one big
database. This information is then analyzed to identify each cross-border
holding or subsidiary link by the national identification number of the
companies involved. This allows us to have information about the nation-
ality of the ownership, foreign or domestic. Firms for which we could not
trace ownership information in the Amadeus data set were dropped from
the analysis. Thus the ownership information that we use should be a good
measure of whether a firm is domestically privately owned, foreign-owned
or state-owned. Because the ownership information is only recorded at the
time that the data are collected by BvD, the ownership status does not
vary, but refers to the latest data that were collected. We therefore used
two different CD-ROMS, one referring to the data collected in the year
1997 and one referring to the data collected in 1998. This allowed us to
trace the changes in ownership status. We define majority-owned private
domestic firms as firms for which domestic investors own more than 50%
of the shares. Majority-owned foreign firms are firms for which one or
more foreign investors own more than 50% of the shares.
3. Data at the Sector Level
Sector-level information was provided by the respective National
Statistical Offices. The Herfindahl index (HERF) is the sum of squared
market share in a given three-digit NACE industry. The import share
(IMP) is the ratio of imports to the sum of domestic sales and imports also
in a given three-digit industry. These data were provided to us by Rumen
Dobrisnki for Bulgaria and by Ion Anton for Romania, for which we
gratefully thank them.
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